William Jones
10000 Mount High Blvd.
Nowhere, California
Private Attorney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ____________

William Jones                ) CASE NO.  __________________
                             )
     Petitioner,             ) PETITION FOR
                             ) WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
v.                           ) BY A PEOPLE IN STATE CONSTRUCTIVE
                             ) CUSTODY (NOT SENTENCED TO DEATH)
STATE OF NEVADA,             ) 
COUNTY OF CLARK,             ) Re:  Las Vegas Justice Court
MICHAEL A. MILLER,           )          Case No. XXXXXXXXX 
DAVID SMITH,                 )      Clark County District Court
BECKY E. HASSALER, and       )          Case No. YYYYYYYY
JAMESON R. KISSINGER,        ) 
                             ) Magistrate:                  _
     Respondents             )       Date:                  _
                             )       Time:                  _
                             )       Dept:                  _
_____________________________)__________________________________

1.  COMES NOW William Jones, a People of the United States, and petitions the above-entitled court of record for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of constructive custody and restraint of liberty of said William Jones (hereinafter “People”), who is a People of the United States neither in the capacity of a citizen of the United States nor a citizen of the STATE OF NEVADA, and who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the following CUSTODIANS:

STATE OF NEVADA (a legal fiction) 
Attorney General, Carson City Office
100 North Carson Street
Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717

COUNTY OF CLARK (a legal fiction) 
District Attorney
200 South Third Street, 7th Floor
Las Vegas, NV 89155

MICHAEL A. MILLER (a state district court judge), 
200 S. Third St, Las Vegas, NV  89155

DAVID SMITH (a district attorney), 
200 S. Third St., Las Vegas, NV  89155, (702)455-4711.

BECKY E. HASSALER (a deputy district attorney), 
200 S. Third St., Las Vegas, NV  89155, (702)455-4711

JAMESON R. KISSINGER (a peace officer), 
400 E. Stewart, Las Vegas, NV 89101, (702)229-3111.

LAW OF THIS CASE

The accompanying Attachment “A” is incorporated by reference as though fully stated herein.

PETITIONER MAY PROSECUTE A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
TO INQUIRE INTO THE CAUSE OF THE RESTRAINT.

2.  Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.  [28 USC Sec. 2242]

3.  Every person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.  [Nevada Revised Statutes 34.360]

4.  Availability of writ.  Writ of habeas corpus [Nevada Revised Statutes 34.360] is available to allow presentation of questions of law that cannot otherwise be reviewed, or that are so important as to render ordinary procedure inadequate and justify extraordinary remedy.  [State ex rel. Orsborn v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 300, 417 P.2d 148 (1966), cited, Director, Dep’t of Prisons v. Arndt, 98 Nev. 84, at 85.640 P.2d 1318 (1982), Snow v. State, 105 Nev. 521, at 523, 779 P.2d 96 (1989), Boatwright v. Director, Dep’t of Prisons, 109 Nev. 318, at 321, 849 P.2d 274 (1993)]

5.  Writ available to defendant admitted to bail.  Writ of habeas corpus was available to defendant admitted to bail for purpose of challenging probable cause to hold him for trial, because defendant was in constructive custody by reason of bail and was subject to restraint within meaning of Nevada Revised Statutes 34.360.  Jacobson v. State, 89 Nev. 197, 510 P.2d 856 (1973), cited, Franklin v. State, 89 Nev. 382, at 383, 513 P.2d 1252 (1973), Cordova v. City of Reno, 920 F. Supp. 135, at 138 (D. Nev. 1996), see also Sheriff, Nye County v. Davis, 106 Nev. 145, 787 P.2d 1241 (1990)

6.  Constructive Custody.  The availability of the writ of habeas corpus does not depend on the actual detention of petitioner in prison.  It is also available where petitioner is constructively in custody and subject to restraint (In re Petersen (1958) 51 Cal2d 177, 181, 331 P2d 24).

7.  This habeas corpus is prosecuted because the taking of the People into custody was without due process.  The respondent's court acted as a nisi prius court, except that the jurisdiction was fraudulently acquired without William Jones's volunteering or knowingly agreeing to the proceeding.

8.  The nisi prius court is in fact a nis prius court falsa because respondent has taken unlawful dominion of William Jones so as to deprive him of his court.  William Jones should be immediately released so that he may return to the jurisdiction of his own court.

9.  William Jones is subject to unlawful constructive custody and restraint.  William Jones is thus petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus.

BECAUSE NO JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR 
CUSTODY HAS BEEN PROFERRED OR STATED 
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD ISSUE.

10.  Broad Meaning of Jurisdiction on Habeas Corpus.  For purposes of the writ of habeas corpus, as for purposes of prohibition or certiorari, the term "jurisdiction" is not limited to its fundamental meaning, and in such proceedings judicial acts may be restrained or annulled if they are determined to be in excess of the court's powers as defined by constitutional provision, statute, or rules developed by courts (In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal2d 666, 667-668, 36 CalRptr 286, 388 P2d 192).

11.  The liberty of the People is restrained by the CUSTODIANS:  

A.  William Jones is in constructive custody by color of the authority of the United States of America and/or the CUSTODIANS, and is committed for trial before some court thereof; [28 USC 2241(c)(1)]

B.  William Jones is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; [28 USC 2241(c)(3)]

12.  Although the true cause of custody of William Jones is unknown, William Jones on information believes that the claim or authority is under color of law in violation of the Constitutions for the STATE OF NEVADA and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.  The true basis for jurisdiction by the CUSTODIANS has never been proffered or stated.  William Jones, as one of the People, has never knowingly or voluntarily agreed to such jurisdiction.  William Jones has disputed and disputes any factual allegation that he has so agreed.

13.  The jurisdictional facts leading up to the custody and restraint are unknown to the People.  The jurisdictional facts by which the CUSTODIANS presume to continue to deprive the People of his court are unknown to the People.

14.  The People, on information and belief, allege that the CUSTODIANS are funded in whole or in part by the United States of America.  Thus motivated, they are acting, under color of law as contractual agents of their principal, the United States of America.

15.  The CUSTODIANS do not state and the proceedings do not show any lawful authority or jurisdictional facts enabling the CUSTODIANS to lawfully take dominion over a People of the United States.  Lacking such jurisdiction, their actions can only be under color of law, violating due process, in order to execute their own private agendas, whatever they may be.  Therefor a writ of habeas corpus should issue.

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS A PROPER REMEDY 
BECAUSE CUSTODIANS HAVE ENGAGED IN 
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS;
BURDEN IS UPON RESPONDENTS
TO REBUT PRESUMPTION

16.  Petitioner as normally bearing burden of proving facts on which claim for relief is based, but if possibility that increased or additional charges violating due process supporting charge of prosecutorial vindictiveness is at issue, petitioner as only needing to demonstrate facts giving rise to presumption of vindictiveness at which time, even on habeas corpus, burden shifts to people to rebut resumption.  In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal3d 865, 872, 215 CalRptr 267, 700 P2d 1269.

17.  William Jones is under the restraint of a court not of record.  The proceeding came about as a result of prosecutorial vindictiveness.  The following facts support the claim of the prosecutorial vindictiveness:

18.  On or about August 14, 2002, Primary Reporting Officer A. Cook falsely reported in a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Incident Report that William Jones’s “CHARACTERISTIC TYPE” is one who’s “PRIMARY MEANS OF ATT (sic)” is “THREATS” (all caps in original document).  William Jones does not threaten; he is not a person who threatens anyone. This false record keeping is harmful to the good name of the People in the eyes of the court because it falsely portrays William Jones as a potentially violent person unable to resolve a conflict peacefully.  (NOTE:  The false report is in direct violation of the court’s mission statement regarding integrity and fairness:  “The Court is a forum for dispute resolution built on a foundation of personal integrity, equal and informed access and fairness. . .”)  “KISSINGER J” is listed as the “PRIMARY OFFICER” on said incident report.  In retrospect, the People believe that the falsification of the official record is the first sign of a vindictive prosecution.

19.  On August 27, 2002, William Jones met with an investigator, JAMESON R. KISSINGER.  JAMESON R. KISSINGER was angrily accusatory.  It would be an understatement to say that he was not a happy man.  In retrospect, the People believe that the aggressive police harassment at the meeting is the second sign of a forthcoming vindictive prosecution propelled by an angry and resentment‑harboring detective unable to communicate effectively in a contentious discussion initiated by himself.

20.  On November 12, 2002, JAMESON R. KISSINGER executed a libelous declaration against the People.  No factual basis for jurisdiction was stated in the declaration or any supporting papers.  The People believe that the incomplete unsupported declaration is the third sign of a vindictive prosecution.

21.  On November 19, 2002, the declaration by JAMESON R. KISSINGER was filed in the Justice Court.  Further, a criminal complaint (with an unidentified illegible signature) consisting of three counts containing three felony charges was also filed.  The criminal complaint did not state any factual basis for jurisdiction.  The People believe that the incomplete unsupported counts and felony charges accompanied by the declaration are the fourth sign of a vindictive prosecution.

22.  Further, on November 19, 2002 JAMESON R. KISSINGER filed a warrant request for the arrest of Russel S. Keithley.  The warrant request did not state any factual basis for jurisdiction.  The People believe that the incomplete unsupported request is the fifth sign of a vindictive prosecution.

23.  On November 19, 2002 William Jones, through an attorney admitted to practice in the Justice Court, filed a motion to quash the warrant and a request to appear for that purpose.  The court approved the request and set November 21, 2002 for hearing.

24.  On November 20, 2002, with the motion to quash in hand and the knowledge that Russell S. Keithly would appear in court, and based upon the fallacious declaration the Justice Court in Case No. XXXXXXXXX issued an order (warrant) for the arrest of William Jones.  Bail was set at $40,000.  The order specifically stated that the purpose was to “bring him before me at my office in Las Vegas Township.”  The People believe that the issuance of the unnecessary arrest order is the sixth sign of a vindictive prosecution.

25.  On November 21, 2002, in good faith, William Jones at 9:00am, without being arrested or physically forced, made a special appearance in the Justice Court to object to the jurisdiction and quash the warrant.  Although the purpose stated on the warrant (to “bring him before me at my office in Las Vegas Township”) was satisfied and the effect of the warrant was moot, as William Jones stood before the Justice Court the court not of record ordered William Jones to be booked on said bench warrant.  The People believe that the extraordinary abusive enforcement of a moot warrant is the seventh sign of a vindictive prosecution.

26.  On execution of the moot warrant the Justice Court, a court not of record, raised the bail by another $5,000 to a total of $45,000.  The increase is a retaliation against the People who attempted to exercise his right to question the validity of the warrant.  In other words, contrary to Sherer v. Cullen cited below, the court not of record effectively sanctioned William Jones for exercising a well-established right to challenge jurisdiction.

27.  “There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional rights.” [Sherer v. Cullen, 481 F 946.]

27.  The People believe that the additional $5,000 bail constitutes the eighth sign of a vindictive prosecution.

28.  At 9:10am William Jones was taken into custody by Deputy Sheriff Jim Keenen.  Custody was given to Deputy Sheriff Theresa Ware who became the transporting officer.

29.  At 10:31am Deputy Sheriff Theresa Ware falsely certified that Sheriff Jerry Keller served the warrant, arrested, and brought into the Justice Court William Jones, despite the fact that the purpose of the warrant (to “bring him before me at my office in Las Vegas Township.”) was moot.  (NOTE:  This is in direct violation of the court mission’s integrity requirment:  “The Court is a forum for dispute resolution built on a foundation of personal integrity, equal and informed access and fairness. . .”)  She also certified that the sheriff received the warrant on this date, November 21, 2002, the same date in which the People voluntarily appeared at the court.  The People believe that the falsification of the official record is the ninth sign of a vindictive prosecution.

30.  At 11:28am the warrant was cleared from NCJIS wanted person system.  The NCJIS record and Justice Court record falsely show that the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police is the arresting agency, and falsely shows that the reason for the clearing is that the warrant was served.  This false record keeping is harmful to the good name of the People because it falsely portrays William Jones as a fugitive from the system rather than the true fact that he is one who has, does, and will work with the system (as demonstrated by his special appearance at the court room without physical coercion).  (NOTE:  The false record is in direct violation of the court mission’s integrity requirement:  “The Court is a forum for dispute resolution built on a foundation of personal integrity, equal and informed access and fairness. . .”)  This is further aggravated by the fact that his name is now in bad repute on a national scale.  The People believe that that the falsification of the official record is the tenth sign of a vindictive prosecution.

31.  On December 6, 2002, an amended criminal complaint was filed against William Jones.  The charges were expanded to over 500% of the original.  The counts were augmented to 300%.  Now there were nine counts consisting of sixteen charges without any new “evidence”.  What makes this significant is that the investigation had been completed late September, 2002, approximately two months before the original criminal complaint was filed.  In other words, there was no further “evidence” to justify the augmentation of the original complaint.  The People believe that the untimely augmentation of the complaint is an eleventh sign of a vindictive prosecution.

32.  On or about January 21, 2002, with still no statement of jurisdictional authority, the Justice Court bound William Jones over to the Clark County District Court.  On January 22, 2002 the District Attorney, David Smith, and the Deputy District Attorney, Becky E. Hassaler, added their voices to the cacophony of accusations:  They provided for the official record an unverified “information” which was essentially a word‑for‑word restatement of the Amended Criminal Complaint.  It served, and could serve, no purpose other than to augment the paper trail with libelous unsubstantiated claims.  The People believe that the unverified “information” is a twelfth sign of a vindictive prosecution.

33.  On January 30, 2002, the Clark County District Court entered an order restricting the movement and freedom of association of William Jones.  Specifically, he was prohibited from contacting or traveling near certain witnesses in the case.  On the surface, that would seem a reasonable order.  But, within the context of William Jones’s non-violent history and lack of action, namely that he was neither contacting nor traveling near said witness, the order was “from out of the blue.”  The People believe that the spontaneous order that originated without provocation is a thirteenth sign of a vindictive prosecution.  It’s sole purpose is to build a negative picture of William Jones in the eyes of the state court:  it falsely portrays him as a “problem” defendant.

34.  In contrast, it is alleged that one of the prosecution’s  “witnesses” has been actively campaigning against William Jones to destroy his good name and to seek his early demise (i.e. murder).  The campaign has been waged locally, on the Internet, by long distance telephone, and among the mutual family relatives.  The campaign has been successful in that it has polarized several of the familial community, some for and some against.

No orders to control the witness’s aggressive behavior have issued from the court.  The People believe that the witness’ aggressive behavior toward the accused along with the absence of a court limiting his activities is a fourteenth sign of a vindictive prosecution, albeit extracurricular from the prosecutorial system.

35.  Briefly, the above events are summarized here:

EVENT  1.  False portrayal of William Jones as one who makes “threats”.
EVENT  2.  Police harassment
EVENT  3.  Execution of a jurisdictionally baseless declaration
EVENT  4.  Filing of jurisdictionally baseless complaint
EVENT  5.  Filing of jurisdictionally baseless warrant request
EVENT  6.  The court, with knowledge of Russell Keithley’s pending appearance, still authorized the warrant for the arrest of William Jones for purpose of bringing him before the court.
EVENT  7.  The warrant was made moot by the appearance of William Jones, but the court ordered the execution of the moot warrant as he stood before the court.
EVENT  8.  The court sanctions William Jones for his motion by raising the bail by $5,000
EVENT  9.  Deputy Sheriff falsifies record by certifying that William Jones was arrested and brought before the court.
EVENT 10.  Deputy Sheriff falsely notifies Federal authorities that William Jones has been captured and is no longer a fugitive.
EVENT 11.  Amended criminal complaint filed.  Even though no new “evidence” had been developed, charges were increased to over 500% of original; counts increased to 300% of original (Charges from 3 to 16; counts from 3 to 9).
EVENT 12.  With still no statement of jurisdiction, William Jones was bound over to Clark County District Court.  The unverified “information” filed by the District Attorney contained nothing not already stated in the amended complaint.
EVENT 13.  The court, at the unfounded spontaneous request of the Deputy District Attorney, restricted the physical movement of William Jones.  Because William Jones has not and does not engage in the prohibited activities, the order is moot, but it well serves to show the vindictive nature of a prosecution ready, willing, and able to go out of it’s way to falsely portray William Jones as a “problem” defendant.
EVENT 14.  The prosecution has done nothing to stop a witness’s extralegal aggressive behavior toward William Jones.

36.  The motto of the Clark County Office of the District Attorney is from Cicero's De Legibus “Salus populi supremo lex esto" ("The welfare of the people is the highest law").  Historically Cicero’s quote has erroneously led to a philosophy that the "the end justifies the means," a machiavellianism.  This is mentioned here because the motto tends to show the policy and direction of the department.  The above signs of vindictiveness are perfectly aligned with the long discredited philosophy that “the end justifies the means.”

37.  Any one of the dozen+ signs of vindictive prosecution, when taken singly is not necessarily significant.  Together, they evince a pattern that can only be the signature of a vindictive prosecution. 

38.  The CUSTODIANS do not state and the proceedings do not show any lawful authority or jurisdictional facts enabling the CUSTODIANS to lawfully take dominion over a People of the United States.  Lacking such jurisdiction, their actions can only be under color of law, violating due process, in order to execute their own private agendas, whatever they may be (perhaps barratry, i.e. the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise).  They are vindictive:

     “VINDICTIVE…intended to cause anguish or hurt: SPITEFUL”
     [see Internet Merriam Webster Dictionary at www.m‑w.com/cgi‑bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=vindictive ].

39.  If, in their returns, the CUSTODIANS fail to prove the absence of vindictiveness, then the CUSTODIANS must release jurisdiction and custody of William Jones back to the jurisdiction of his own court.  And the court should so order.

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS A PROPER REMEDY
IF PETITIONER HAS REASONABLE APPREHENSION
OF RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY

40.  Constraint by Reasonable Apprehension of Force.  To justify issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, constraint need not consist of actual physical force.  Conduct inducing a reasonable apprehension of force may be sufficient to restrain one of his/her liberty (In re Rider (1920) 50 CalApp 797, 802, 195 P. 965).

41.  Russel S. Keithley has a reasonable apprehension that the CUSTODIANS will exercise force to deprive or restrain his liberty because by order of the court not of record he has been required to involuntarily appear in said court’s proceedings, has been admitted to bail, and has been restricted in his freedom of association and travel; all contrary to the People’s denial of jurisdiction.

42.  Further, when William Jones demonstrated good faith in his appearances, he was still arrested under a moot warrant and the bail was raised.

43.  Because of CUSTODIANS’ history of abuse, a writ of habeas corpus is a proper remedy to ensure that William Jones is released to the jurisdiction of his own court.

A PERSON COMMITTED IN A
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDING MAY
SECURE RELEASE WHERE THERE WAS NOT
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
ALL OF THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

44.  Strict Compliance with Statutory Prerequisites.  Where a person is committed pursuant to a statutory civil commitment proceeding which is in the nature of a special civil proceeding unknown at common law, jurisdiction to enter an order of commitment depends on strict compliance with each of the statutory prerequisites or maintenance of the proceeding, and the requirement of the statute must be at least substantially, if not strictly, followed in order to give the court hearing the proceedings jurisdiction.  The lack of jurisdiction entitles the petitioner to relief by writ of habeas corpus.  (In re Raner (1963) 59 Cal2d 635, 639, 30 CalRptr 814, 301 P2d 638).  

45.  "Henceforth the writ which is called Praecipe shall not be served on any one for any holding so as to cause a free man to lose his court." Magna Carta, Article 34.

46.  "No person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."  U.S. Constitution, Amendment V.

47.  In this matter William Jones is a People of the United States.  As such, without due process the respondents have caused William Jones to lose his court.

48.  "No officer can acquire jurisdiction by deciding he has it. The officer, whether judicial or ministerial, decides at his own peril."Middleton v. Low (1866), 30 C. 596, citing Prosser v. Secor (1849), 5 Barb.(N.Y) 607, 608.

49.  Rhetorically, the question could be asked, "Is it an act of treason when a public official takes unlawful dominion over the sovereign People of the United States?  Could such state officials be prosecuted under 18 USC 242 which makes it a federal crime to deprive or conspire to deprive, under color of law, any person of his rights.

50.  In this case, strict compliance with the procedure was not followed.  A necessary element is that William Jones must voluntarily and knowingly agree to any proceeding outside of the penumbra of a court of record.  William Jones neither volunteered nor knowingly agreed to what must necessarily be a strict nisi prius procedure.  The element of due process is missing.  Therefor a writ of habeas corpus should issue.

THE STATE MAY NOT DIMINISH
THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF WILLIAM JONES

51.  It is the design of our systems of jurisprudence that courts have no jurisdiction until a party comes forth and declares a cause needing resolution.  The particular jurisdiction depends upon how the cause is declared by the moving party.  Jurisdiction may be administrative, at law, in equity, or in any of many other formats.  In this habeas corpus proceeding the jurisdiction is at law in a court of record under the sovereign authority of one of the people.

52.  It is essential to understand what are a sovereign, a magistrate, a court, and a court of record.

53.  A court is "The person and suit of the sovereign."NOTE-1  Who is the sovereign? It is the people either in pluralNOTE-2 or in singular capacity.NOTE-3 In singular capacity, it is William Jones, one of the people as contemplated in the preambles of the Constitution for the STATE OF NEVADA, and the 1789 Constitution for the United States of America.  In singular capacity, it is also William Jones.

54.  The STATE OF NEVADA, and the United States of America have no general sovereignty.  Theirs is a clipped sovereignty.  Whatever sovereignty they have is limited to their respective constitutionally defined spheres of control.  The general sovereignty is reserved to the people without diminishment.NOTE-4  Lest that be forgotten, the analogous California Government Code twice admonishes the public servants that, "The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them."NOTE-5  Further, when the State of California did attempt to diminish one's rights, it was affirmed that the state cannot diminish rights of the people.NOTE-6  Further, Amendments IX and X of the Constitution for the United States of America admonishes the federal government of its clipped sovereignty subservient to the full sovereignty reserved without diminishment to the People.NOTE-10

55.  It is by the prerogative of the sovereignNOTE-7 whether and how a court is authorized to proceed.  In this case, the chosen form of this court is that of a court of record.

56.  A qualifying feature of a court of record is that the tribunal is independent of the magistrate appointed to conduct the proceedings.NOTE-8

57.  The magistrate is a person appointed or elected to perform ministerial service in a court of record.NOTE-9  His service is ministerial because all judicial functions in a court of record are reserved to the tribunal, and, by definition of a court of record, that tribunal must be independent of the magistrate.  The non-judicial functions are assigned by the court of record and are "ministerial" because they are absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely execution of specific duties arising from fixed and designated facts.  

58.  Because the state has no jurisdiction over William Jones, and because the magistrate has no tribunal function, and because William Jones has not voluntarily and knowingly granted any jurisdiction to the state, it follows that the state has no jurisdiction over William Jones.  Therefor, the state must cease its taking into involuntary custody the person of William Jones, one of the People.  As a matter of right, William Jones should be immediately released back to the jurisdiction of his own court.

NOTES

NOTE-1 Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 425, 426

NOTE-2 PEOPLE, n. [L. populus.] The body of persons who compose a community, town, city or nation.  We say, the people of a town; the people of London or Paris; the English people.  In this sense, the word is not used in the plural, but it comprehends all classes of inhabitants, considered as a collective body…  Webster's 1828 Dictionary

NOTE-3 PEOPLE…considered as....any portion of the inhabitants of a city or country.  Ibid.

NOTE-4 "...at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects...with none to govern but themselves" CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA (US) 2 Dall 419, 454, 1 L Ed 440, 455 @DALL 1793 pp471-472 

The people of this State, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled to all the rights which formerly belonged to the King by his prerogative.  Through the medium of their Legislature they may exercise all the powers which previous to the Revolution could have been exercised either by the King alone, or by him in conjunction with his Parliament;…" Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wendell 9 (N.Y.) (1829), 21 American Decision 89; 10C Const. Law Sec. 298; 18 C Em.Dom. Sec. 3, 228; 37 C Nav.Wat. Sec. 219; Nuls Sec. 1`67; 48 C Wharves Sec. 3, 7.

NOTE-5 California Government Code, Sections 11120 and 54950

NOTE-6 The state cannot diminish rights of the people. Hurtado v. People of the State of California, 110 US 516

NOTE-7 "...at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects...with none to govern but themselves..... [CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA (US) 2 Dall 419, 454, 1 L Ed 440, 455 @DALL (1793) pp471-472.]

The people of this State, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled to all the rights which formerly belonged to the King by his prerogative.  [Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (N.Y.) (1829), 21 Am.Dec. 89 10C Const. Law Sec. 298; 18 C Em.Dom. Sec. 3, 228; 37 C Nav.Wat. Sec. 219; Nuls Sec. 167; 48 C Wharves Sec. 3, 7.]

NOTE-8 Court of Record: A judicial tribunal having attributes and exercising functions independently of the person of the magistrate designated generally to hold it [Jones v. Jones, 188 Mo.App. 220, 175 S.W. 227, 229; Ex parte Gladhill, 8 Metc. Mass., 171, per Shaw, C.J. See, also, Ledwith v. Rosalsky, 244 N.Y. 406, 155 N.E. 688, 689][Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 425, 426]

NOTE-9 Long v. Seabrook, 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659, 662; Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p 899

NOTE-10 Constitution for the United States of America:

Amendment IX.  The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Article X.  The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

59.  Further, I request that the proceedings in the STATE OF NEVADA, CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, Case No. YYYYYYYY; and Las Vegas Justice Court, case No. XXXXXXXXX, be ordered stayed pending resolution of the jurisdictional challenge in the above-entitled court of record. 

60.  I am William Jones.  I have personal knowledge of the above-stated facts and am competent to testify as to the truth of these facts if called as a witness.  I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed in Las Vegas, Nevada, on February 29, 2000.

William Jones
Petitioner