Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 14:51:00 -0700
Subject: RE: Which class of taxpayer are you?  - WRONG, WHICH CLASS OF TAX PAYER AREN'T U
Message-ID: <BAY2-F112X3qrB0Xn2P00020fc3@hotmail.com>
 
From Luis Ewing at (253) 226-3741 or rcwcodebuster@hotmail.com
NO, THE QUESTION SHOULD BE WHICH CLASS OF TAXPAYER AREN'T YOU???
STATE OF WASHINGTON has a Federal Tax ID Number and is a Federal Municipal Corporation and by operation of law is a Territory and Possession of the Corporate United States.
STATE OF OREGON has a Federal Tax ID Number and is a Federal Municipal Corporation and by operation of law is a Territory and Possession of the Corporate United States.
STATE OF IDAHO has a Federal Tax ID Number and is a Federal Municipal Corporation and by operation of law is a Territory and Possession of the Corporate United States.
ALL STATES today have FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBERS and are ALL FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Every City in your CORPORATE STATE has a FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBER and is in fact and law a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Every County in your CORPORATE STATE has a FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBER and is in fact and law a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
WE DO NOT HAVE THREE (3) BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT IN ANY CITY, COUNTY OR STATE AND THERE IS NO REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN PLACE IN ANY SO CALLED STATE TODAY.
ALL CITIES, COUNTIES AND STATES ARE TWO (2) BRANCH CORPORATIONS AND WE LIVE IN MARTIN LUTHER KING'S "DEMOCRACY."
MARTIN LUTHER KING WAS TELLING US THE TRUTH OVER TWENTY YEARS AGO AND THEY CONSIDERED HIM DANGEROUS BECAUSE HE WAS LETTING TOO MUCH OUT AND THEY SHOT HIM FOR IT.
WANT PROOF?
Go down to your CITY CLERK and ask to purchase a CERTIFIED COPY of your CITY CHARTER and ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION for the City.
Go down to your COUNTY CLERK and ask to purchase a CERTIFIED COPY of your COUNTY CHARTER and ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION for the County.
YOU WILL FIND OUT THAT ALL CITIES ONLY HAVE TWO (2) BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT!
YOU WILL FIND OUT THAT ALL COUNTIES ONLY HAVE TWO (2) BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT!
The ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION WILL SHOW YOU THAT THEY INCORPORATED A PIECE OF DIRT WITH THE METES AND BOUNDS MARKED OUT!
What Legal or Lawful Authority does a Piece of Land that Incorporated and called itself the CITY OF SEATTLE have to hire an armed body of men called the SEATTLE POLICE?
The United States Supreme Court in a case called United States vs. Soriano said that an ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY is a creature of Statute created by the Legislature!
"An administrative agency is a creature of statute (Soriano v. U.S., 494 F2d 681, 683 (9th Circuit 1974) 
As a corporation is to its charter, the administrative is to its enabling legislation. This means the basic doctrine of administrative law, as of corporate law, is the doctrine of ultra vires. The jurisdiction principle is the root principle of administrative power. The statute is the source of agency authority as well as its limits. If an agency act is within the statutory limits (vires) it is valid. If it is outside them (ultra vires), it is invalid. No statute is needed to establish this; it is inherent in the constitutional positions of agencies and courts (Stark v. Wickard, 420 F2d 592."
"RCW 42.17.020(1), enacted some time after WAPA, where the legislature specifically defined "agency" to include "all state agencies and all local agencies." It more particularly defined "state agency" in the statute to include "every state office, public official, department, division, bureau, board, commission or other state agency." The definition of "local agency" is equally particular and complete.
"Local agency" includes every county, city, city and county, school district, municipal corporation, district, political subdivision, or any board, commission or agency thereof, or other local public agency. RCW 42.17.020(1).
The definition of "state agency" in RCW 42.17.020(1) parallels the definition of "agency" in RCW 34.04.010(1) as to state boards, commissions, departments, and officers (officials)." RIGGINS v. HOUSING AUTHORITY, 87 Wn.2d 97, 100, 549 P.2d 480 (May 6th, 1976). And;
"[1] The source of a state agency’s rights, powers, duties, and privileges and immunities is statutory." LIQUOR CONTROL BD. v. PERSONNEL BD., 88 Wn.2d 368, 371, 561 P.2d 195 (March 10, 1977). And;
"If it is a state agency, it must conform to the Administrative Procedure Act (RCW 34.04)." STATE v. BOARD OF VALUATION, 72 Wn.2d 66, 69 (Sept. 14, 1967). And;
"STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENACT THE REGULATION [3] We agree with appellants, an agency created by the statute has only those powers expressly granted or necessarily implied from the statute. Ortblad v. State, 85 Wn.2d 109, 530 P.2d 635 (1975); State v. Pierce, 11 Wn. App. 577, 523 P.2d 1201 (1974). An agency cannot legislate, its rules must be within its statutory framework. Kitsap-Mason Dairymen’s Ass’n v. State Tax Comm’n, 77 Wn.2d 94, 309 P.2d 751." ANDERSON LEECH & MORSE v. LIQUOR BD., 89 Wn.2d 688, 694, 575 P.2d 221 (Feb. 16, 1978). And;
"[2] We note that an administrative agency created by statute has only those powers expressly granted by the statute or necessarily implied therefrom. Barendregt v. Walla Walla Sch. Dist. 140, 26 Wn. App. 246, 249, 611 P.2d 1385 (1980) (citing Orblad v. State, 85 Wn.2d 109, 117, 530 P.2d 635 (1975))." BUTLER v. REPUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, 34 Wn. App. 421, 661 P.2d 1005 (April 12, 1983). And;
"An administrative agency, like the board, has only those powers granted it by the legislature. Cole v. State, Utils. & Transp. Comm’n, 79 Wn.2d 302, 306, 485 P.2d 71 (1971)." IN RE LITTLE, 95 Wn.2d 545, 627 P.2d 543 (April 30, 1981). And;
"An administrative agency, like the Board, only has those powers granted by the Legislature. In re Little, 95 Wn.2d 545, 549, 627 P.2d 543 (1981). . . . The Board may not amend or alter the statutes under which it functions by its own interpretation of those statutes. In re George, 90 Wn.2d 90, 97, 579 P.2d 354 (1978). ...This it cannot do. Baker v. Morris, 84 Wn.2d 804, 809, 529 P.2d 1091 (1974). This court presumes the validity of administrative rules adopted pursuant to a legislative grant of authority, and will uphold such rules on review if they are reasonably consistent with the statute being implemented. Fahn v. Cowlitz Cy., 93 Wn.2d 368, 374, 610 P.2d 857, 621 P.2d 1293 (1980). . . . [6] The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "a statute so vague and indefinite, in form as interpreted", may violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509, 92 L.Ed. 8450, 68 S. Ct. 6665 (1948). This court specifically has held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires specificity in penal statutes. Seattle v. Rice, 93 Wn.2d 728, 731, 612 P.2d 792 (1980). The test is whether men of reasonable understanding are required to guess at the meaning of the statute. Seattle v. Rice, at 731. See also Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wn.2d 405, 408, 423 P.2d 522, 25 A.L.R.3d 827 (1967)." IN RE MYERS, 105 Wn.2d 257, 263, 714 P.2d 303 (February 13, 1986), And;
THIS ALLEGED [court](sic) MUST TAKE ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE ER 201(d)(e)(f) of CR 44.1 DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN LAW the same as in RCW 5.24.210, and I now adopt all the foreign case law stated herein by reference into the jurisdiction of this case in the premises pursuant to your rules CR10(c), and CRLJ 10(b).
"It is well settled in administrative law that: "It is the accepted rule, not only in state courts, but, of the federal courts as well, that when a judge is enforcing administrative law they are described as mere ‘extensions of the administrative agency for superior reviewing purposes’ as a ministerial clerk for an agency..." 30 Cal.596; 167 Cal 762. And;
"A judge ceases to sit as a judicial officer because the governing principals of administrative law provides that courts are prohibited from substituting their evidence, testimony, record, arguments and rationale for that of the agency. Additionally, courts are prohibited from their substituting their judgments for that of the agency." AISI v. U.S., 568 F.2d 284. And;
". . . judges who become involved in enforcement of mere statutes (civil or criminal in nature and otherwise), act as mere "clerks" of the involved agency..." K.C. Davis., ADMIN. LAW, Ch. 1 (CTP. West’s 1965 Ed.) "...their supposed "courts" becoming thus a court of "limited jurisdiction" as a mere extension of the involved agency for mere superior reviewing purposes." K.C. Davis, ADMIN. LAW., P. 95, (CTP, 6 Ed. West’s 1977)>FRC v. G.E., 281 U.S. 464; Keller v P>E., 261 U.S. 428. And;
A so-called Municipal or District court that is not a constitutional court is a legislative tribunal. In speaking on this subject in relation to the Constitution for the united States of America, the supreme Court said:
"The term ‘District Courts of the United States,’ . . . without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the constitutional courts created under Article III of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories are legislative courts, properly speaking, and are not District Courts of the United States." Mookini v. United States, 303 US 201, 205, 58 Sct. 543, 82 Led. 748 ((1938). 
This expression of the supreme Court of the united States of America shows that no constitutional judicial power is exercised by legislative courts, instead such courts only exercise a power derived from the legislative branch as an extension of the legislative rather than judicial power. A legislative tribunal does not exercise judicial power, but merely administers legislative powers according to the nature of its creation.
"Territorial courts are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the third article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States." 9 Federal Statutes Annotated 212. And;
In constitutional courts (those courts that exercise judicial powers) the legislative branch cannot prescribe any qualification for the office of judge not prescribed by the constitution from which jurisdiction is vested." State ex rel. Chapman v. Appling, 220 Or. 41, 348 P.2d 759 (1960). 
The power of the Municipal or District Court is that of the old "justice of the peace" courts which were courts of "limited and special jurisdiction." State v. Officer, 4 Or. 180 (1871).
Inferior tribunals are subject to the supervisory control (judicial powers), and must show affirmative proof on the face on the inferior tribunal record to sustain a conviction.
"If the court is . . . of some special statutory jurisdiction it is as to such proceedings an inferior court, and not aided by presumption of jurisdiction." Norman v. Zeiber, 3 Or 198.
Inferior tribunals have no presumption of jurisdiction in their favor and all that need to be done by Petitioner, to throw the burden of proving jurisdiction upon Respondent State of Washington, was to contest the applicability of the inferior tribunals jurisdiction to Petitioner.
" . . . if the record does not show upon its face the facts necessary to give jurisdiction, they will be presumed not to have existed." Norman v. Zeiber, 3 Or. 198. And;
The constitutional rule for inferior tribunals was set down by the Oregon Supreme Court in Evans v. Marvin, 76 Or. 540, 148 P 1119 (1915), a case involving a justice court:
" . . . the constitutional rule that justices courts are of limited jurisdiction. ...their judgments must be sustained affirmatively by positive proof that they had jurisdiction of the cases they attempt to decide." Evans v. Marvin, 76 Or. 540, 148 P 119 (1915). And;
ALL Muncipal Court's in STATE OF WASHINGTON were created by two Statutes RCW 35.20 and RCW 3.50.010 which both were created by the LEGISLATURE.
"The town of Orting had elected to create a municipal court under the authority of RCW 3.50.010. This statute provides that procedure in the municipal court is subject to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. RCW 3.50.450.Thus, the controlling rules of procedure are found in the Traffic Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction promulgated by this court, effective July 1, 1963. See JTR T2, RCW vol. 0. Orting v. Rucshner, 66 Wn 2d (Aug. 1965). And;
All District Court's in STATE OF WASHINGTON were created by Statute RCW 3.66 which was created by the LEGISLATURE.
All Superior Court's in STATE OF WASHINGTON were created by Statute RCW Title 2 which was created by the LEGISLATURE.
The so called SUPREME COURT of STATE OF WASHINGTON was created by Statute RCW Title 2 which was created by the Legislature.
ALL JUDICIAL DISTRICTS WERE ABOLISHED IN 1856 BY THE 34TH CONGRESS.
MARY ANN BOYER vs. MILES FOWLER et al.
The act of Congress Aug. 16, 1856, regulating Courts in this Territory, and requiring the Judges of the Supreme Court to assign places for holding Courts, took effect when the order was made, pursuant to the act.  The Judicial District of King county having been abolished, by the order of the judges, Nov. 10, 1856, under said act, the clerk of that Court, from that date, lost his legal existence–hence his subsequent official acts were nullities.  "A majority of the Judges met in Olympia, then the Capital of the Territory, on the 10th day of November, 1856, and made the necessary order to give effect to the act of Congress. It has been held by this court, in the case of the Territory vs. Leschi, that this act took effect from the time the orders were made by the Judges of the Supreme Court. It is claimed however, that the act of Congress contemplated something more than an informal meeting of the Judges. It will be observed on an examination of the act , that no terms are used indicating orders in term time –the reference is to the orders of the Judges, or a majority of them, and not of the Court.  The organic act confers upon the Judges the appointment of clerks for the District Courts. King county, up to the passage of the act of Congress referred to, was a Judicial District. On the said order of the Judges made the 10th day of November, 1856, the District Court for King County was merged into the District Court for the Second Judicial District. The clerk of the King county District Court, for ministerial or judicial purposes, ceased to exist; and as this suit was instituted subsequently to the order made by the Judges, and the bond on which the recovery is claimed, was executed on the 13th day of December, 1856, it follows that there was no District Court for King county –- no clerk having a legal official existence, and the whole proceeding a nullity. MARY ANN BOYER vs. MILES FOWLER et al. [1 Wash.T Sup. Ct. Dec. 1860] 
ALL CITY AND COUNTY CHARTERS IN EVERY STATE WILL CLEARLY SHOW THAT WE HAVE ONLY EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES IN EVERY STATE!
You will find that in every County Charter they name your Superior Court System something like they do here in Washington like the KING COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
"The King County Department of Judicial Administration by its name falls within the definition of agency. Furthermore, KING COUNTY CHARTER 350.20 PROVIDES THAT IT IS A EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT." NAST v. MICHELS, 107 Wn.2d 300, 305, 730 P.2d 54 (Dec. 4, 1986). And;
HAVE YOU EVER FAILED TO APPEAR i.e. FTA for any type of a court appearance?
Have you ever been in court and heard the so called JUDGE a so called JUDICIAL OFFICER say: "ISSUE A WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST"???
That's because the so called JUDGE a so called JUDICIAL OFFICER IS NOT REALLY JUDICIAL, HE IS EXECUTIVE.
Even your phony Constitution and your State Statutes will clearly show that the EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY is vested Solely in the office of the Elected County Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor, Special Prosecutor and/or Attorney General's Office.
All so called Judges are in fact and law EXECUTIVE OFFICERS and that is why the so called JUDGE CAN ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST WHEN YOU FAIL TO APPEAR!
ALL so called State Court's are creatures of Statute created by the LEGISLATURE and are merely ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES which only have the authority or jurisdiction conferred by a Statute.
If you search carefully the Senate and House Bills and the 1st Legislative Enactment or Session Law creating the Superior Court's in your State, you will find that it says right in your own law books, that ALL your so called State Superior Court's are really LOWER DISTRICT FEDERAL COURTS!
THAT'S RIGHT, WE HAVE NO STATE COURT'S IN EXISTENCE TODAY!

Your STATE is merely a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION pretending to be and fraudulently holding itself out to be a State, but in fact and law is NOT a State in Original Jurisdiction pursuant to the authority of the 1st Original Judiciary Act wherein the District of Columbia is NOT a State.
Your STATE is merely a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION under the NEW JUDICIARY ACT wherein the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA is now on an Equal Footing as a STATE.
ALL so called PRIVATE EMPLOYERS like McDonalds, Safeway, Albertsons, Schucks Auto Supply, Al's Auto Supply, etc. have FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBERS issued from the FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATE STATE and are ALL UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ETC. ARE ALL UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS.
When you put your SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER DOWN ON AN EMPLOYMENT APPLICATION, you are asking UNCLE SAM to put you on the GOVERNMENT PAYROLL for FUTURE L & I BENEFITS IF YOU GET HURT ON THE JOB, FUTURE UNEMPLOYMENT SHOULD YOU GET LAID OFF FROM YOUR JOB, FUTURE FOOD STAMPS, FUTURE MEDICAID, FUTURE MEDICARE, FUTURE FOOD STAMPS, WELFARE, ETC.
Every Municipal Court in your State has a FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBER and is also a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Every District Court in your State has a FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBER and is also a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Every Justice of the Peace Court in your State has a FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBER and is also a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Every Circuit Court in your State has a FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBER and is also a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Every Superior Court in your State has a FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBER and is also a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Every Supreme Court in every STATE has a FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBER and is also a FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
If your so called STATE COURT is really a State Court, why does it have a FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBER?
Do you really believe your STATE COURT is a State Court in Original Juridiction?  Ha, Ha.
Did you folks know that EVERY SINGLE COURT IN EVERY STATE IS REALLY A LOWER DISTRICT FEDERAL COURT??????????
READ THE FOLLOWING WASHINGTON STATE CASE LAW THAT PROVES IT:
The Washington State Supreme Court states that they "(a)re bound by the [U.S.] Supreme Court" State v Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983). 
In Hayne on New Trial and Appeal (Revised Edition), vol. 2, section 291, this language is used: "Under the rule of stare decisis, as shown in the preceeding section, if a decision be clearly erroneous and rights have not grown up under it to any great extent, it may be overruled. But this is not true of a subsequent appeal in the same cause. However erroneous a decision of the supreme court may be, it must be adhered to in all subsequent stages of the same case. It becomes the law of the case and cannot be disregarded either by the trial court or by the supreme court. This rule is firmly established." DUFFY v. BLAKE, 94 Wash. 319, 322 [No. 13201. En. Banc. January 20, 1917.] And;
It has become the law of this case." GUARANTEE TRUST CO. v. SCOON, 144 Wash. 33, 36 (May 17, 1927). And;
[1] When this court has once decided a question of law, that decision, when the question arises again, is not only binding on all inferior courts in this state, but is binding on this court until that case is overruled. Duffy v. Blake, 94 Wash. 319, 162 Pac. 521; Guarantee Trust Co. v. Scoon, 144 Wash. 33, 256 Pac. 74" GODEFROY v. REILLY, 146 Wash. 257, 259 (January 3, 1928). And;
"[1] At the outset, we reaffirm our recognition of the authority of the United States Supreme Court to act as the final arbiter of controversies arising under the federal constitution. In all matters touching upon federal rights, the United States Supreme Court may review state court decisions. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 4 L. Ed. 97 *1816) (authority to review state civil cases); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821) (authority to review state criminal cases)." STATE v. CHRISMAN, 100 Wn.2d 814, 816, 676 P.2d 419 [No. 46750-1. En Banc. January 26, 1984.] And;
"[1] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (24)–COURTS (38)–PRESUMPTIONS–RULES OF DECISION–UNITED STATES COURTS. Upon Federal questions statutes will be presumed constitutional and valid unless clearly to the contrary; and the decisions of the United States supreme court are binding on state courts. ...We are firmly bound to conform to the decisions of the United States supreme court upon such questions as any Federal or other court." GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY v. STATE, 147 Wash. 630, 637 [Nos. 21092, 21093. En Banc. May 8, 1928.] And;
THERE YOU HAVE IT, THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT SAYS WE ARE BOUND TO THE DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT THE SAME AS ANY OTHER "FEDERAL COURT"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"The supreme court of the United States is a constitutional court. All other Federal courts have been established by acts of Congress, pursuant to authority granted by the constitution of the United States, and, being courts provided for by legislative, and not directly by constitutional authority, the Congress may enact any laws it deems wise for the conduct and operation of such courts." STATE EX REL. N.W. OYSTER CO. v. MEAKIM, 34 Wn.(2d) 131, 138 (July 14, 1949). And;
THE LEGISLATURE IN WASHINGTON LIKE ALL OTHER STATES CREATED EVERY COURT IN THE STATE BY STATUTE!
"State courts must follow the interpretations of the federal constitution made by the United States Supreme Court." STATE v. LAVIOLLETTE, 118 Wn.2d 670, 826 P.2d 684 [No. 58076-6. En Banc. March 19, 1992.] And;
"Decisions of the United States Supreme Court are controlling over conflicting case law and statutory law of this state." STATE v. COUNTS, 99 Wn.2d 54, 659 P.2d 1087 [Nos. 47687-0, 48239-0, 47932-1. En Banc. February 24, 1983.] And;
THERE YOU HAVE IT, THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT TELLING YOU THAT THE FEDERAL UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS CONTROL OVER THE STATE!
"Further, once this court has decided an issue of state law, that interpretation is binding on all lower courts until it is overruled by this court. Godefroy v. Reilly, 146 Wash. 257, 262 P. 639 (1928); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375, 70 L. Ed. 2d 556, 102 S. Ct. 703 (1982) ("unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this court must be followed by the lower federal courts . . ."). State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 487, 681 P.2d 227, 39 A.L.R. 4th 975 (1984). And;
THERE YOU HAVE IT, THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT TELLING YOU THAT OUR COURT IS A LOWER FEDERAL COURT!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"The Supreme Court’s resolution of an issue of state law constitutes binding precedent until the Supreme Court overrules it." HAMILTON v. LABOR & INDUS., 111 Wn. 2d 569, 761 P.2d 618 [No. 54621-5. En Banc. September 22, 1988.] And;
"A Supreme Court holding constitutes binding authority that may not be overruled by the Court of Appeals." STATE v. WILLIAMS, 93 Wn. App. 340, 969 P.2d 106 (December 4, 1998.) And;
There are NO State Court's in existence today period!
Look at STATE COURT RULE AND FEDERAL COURT RULE NUMBER 2 wherein they combined "law and equity" into one form of action called CIVIL.
Did you know that CONGRESS NEVER empowered the States to combine "law and equity" into one form of action called CIVIL?
Did you know that ALL Bankrupty, Divorce and Property Disputes are IN REM proceedings?
Did you know that CONGRESS NEVER empowered the States to proceed IN REM?
Did you know that ALL IN REM proceedings original jurisdiction lies exclusive of the States and solely to the FEDERAL COURTS or to the Court's of the Territories or Possessions?
CAN ONE SOVEREIGN TAX ANOTHER SOVEREIGN?
Why then are FEDERAL TAXES being deducted out of all STATE COURT JUDGES PAYCHECKS?
McDonalds, Safeway, Albertsons, Schucks Auto Supply, Al's Auto Supply, etc., are ALL Political Subdivisions of the FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATE STATE.
ALL EMPLOYEES OF McDonalds, Safeway, Albertsons, Schucks Auto Supply, Al's Auto Supply, etc. are QUASI FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES because these entities ALL have FEDERAL TAX ID NUMBERS AND ARE ALL UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS.
STATE OF WASHINGTON IS A FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
YOU CANNOT BE A STATE CITIZEN OF THESE CORPORATE STATES!
MANY PATRIDIOTS who are just to lazy to do their own research and even Attorneys like LARRY BECRAFT have failed miserabley in court and just have NO understanding of the law and have NO clue have made the SILLY and FRIVOUS argument that they were NOT a 14th Amendment U.S. Corporate Slave and then turned around in the same sentence and claimed to be State Citizens of the current STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF WASHINGTON, ETC. and the Judges and Prosecutors just snickered and giggled prior to sending these yo yos to jail.
It seems like EVERYBODY knows that there are THREE (3) different United States!
Did you know that the same rule applies to the States?
All States suspended their Original State Constitutions and placed them into the Archives Division of their Secretary of State's Office and then replaced them with a much watered down version which took away ALL of our Rights and replaced them with Corporate Privileges and codified them and made the constitutions a mere statute which is now superceded by the specific statute such as speeding, running a red light, etc. 
Every STATE has two, three or more constitutions, but NO State is operating or going by their Original Constitution!
Did you know that every 1st Original State Constitution had the RIGHT TO TRAVEL written right in it and says THE HIGHWAYS SHALL FOREVER BE TO ALL PERSONS FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF THEIR PERSONS AND PROPERTY FOR FREE THE SAME AS THE WATERWAYS and are ALL worded or patterned after the NORTHWEST ORDINANCE AND TREATY OF GUADALUPE which say THE WATERWAYS SHALL FOREVER BE FREE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS AND THEIR PROPERTY.
That's Right, THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL IS A STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT AND UNDER THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE AND THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE IS THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
All NEW STATE CONSTITUTIONS only gave authority to the CORPORATE STATES TO REGULATE COMMON CARRIERS, PRIVATE CARRIERS AND CONTRACT CARRIERS.
HAVE YOU EVER READ THE BUCK ACT?
STATE OF WASHINGTIN is a STATE within a State.
YOU NEED TO READ THE BUCK ACT TO UNDERSTAND THAT STATE OF WASHINGTON is a "STATE WITHIN "The State of Washington."
See RCW 82.04.200 which reads:
"RCW 82.04.200 In this state" and "WITHIN THIS STATE" "IN THIS STATE" and "WITHIN THIS STATE" includes all federal areas lying within the exterior boundaries of the state. [1961 c 15 82.04.200. Prior: 1955 c 389 21; prior L 1949 c 228 2, part; 1945 c 249 1, part; 1943 c 156 2, part; 1941 c 178 2, part; 1939 c 225 2, part; 1937 c 227 2, part; 1935 c 180 5, part; Rem. Supp. 1949 8370-5, part.] (emphasis added). And;
"IN THIS STATE," "WITHIN THIS STATE" as stated in the above current 1999 RCW Code Section is not one of the united States of America in its original jurisdiction, nor is it part of "The State of Washington." See page 94 Session Laws of 1889-1890, December 13, 1889, making by Legislative Fiat, "State" or "State of Washington" in the Law mean, Territory or Territory of Washington. "WA" is a "fictional State within a state" which was NOT in existence at the time of the creation of The State of Washington, nor was it in existence at the time of the creation of the Territorial Code of 1881 which is still valid law today pursuant to the fact that the Code of 1881 has never been repealed. And;
See RCW Titles 46 and 47 wherein their code sections apply only to the above defined federal areas, to wit: "In this state" and "within this state. See the Buck Act of 1940 cited below at page 4, lines 22-24, to wit: it’s codification at USC 4, §§ 105,110, et. sec., is the ciliset or vidiliset. And;
RCW 82.04.010 Introductory.
Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions set forth in the sections preceding RCW 82.04.220 apply throughout this chapter. [1996 c 93 § 4; 1961 c 15 § 82.04.010. Prior: 1955 c 389 § 2; prior: 1949 c 228 § 2, part; 1945 c 249 § 1, part; 1943 c 156 § 2, part; 1941 c 178 § 2, part; 1939 c 225 § 2, part; 1937 c 227 § 2, part; 1935 c 180 § 5, part; Rem. Supp. 1949 § 8370-5, part.]. And;
CHAPTER 82.52 EXTENSION OF EXCISES TO FEDERAL AREAS
Sections
82.52.010 STATE ACCEPTS PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL (BUCK) ACT.
82.52.020 STATE'S TAX LAWS MADE APPLICABLE TO FEDERAL
AREAS--EXCEPTION.
NOTES: Federal areas and jurisdiction: Title 37 RCW. Taxation of federal agencies and instrumentalities: State Constitution Art. 7 §§ 1, 3. And;
RCW 82.52.010 STATE ACCEPTS PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL (BUCK) ACT.
The state hereby accepts jurisdiction over all federal areas located "within" its exterior boundaries to the extent that the power and authority to levy and collect taxes therein is granted by that certain act of the 76th congress of the United States, approved by the president on October 9, 1940, and entitled: "An Act to permit the states to extend their sales, use, and income taxes TO PERSONS RESIDING OR CARRYING ON BUSINESS, OR TO TRANSACTIONS OCCURRING, IN FEDERAL AREAS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." [1961 c 15 § 82.52.010. Prior: 1941 c 175 § 1; Rem. Supp. 1941 § 11337-10.] And;
RCW 47.04.050 Acceptance of federal acts.
The "STATE OF WASHINGTON" hereby assents to the purposes, provisions, terms and conditions of the grant of money provided in an act of congress entitled: "An act to provide that the United States shall aid the states in the construction of rural post roads, and for other purposes," approved July 11, 1916, and all acts, grants and appropriations amendatory and supplementary thereto and affecting the "STATE OF WASHINGTON". [1961 c 13 § 47.04.050. Prior: 1937 c 53 § 43; RRS § 6400-43; 1917 c 76 § 1; RRS § 6844.] And;
RCW 47.42.920 FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS--CONFLICT AND ACCORD.
If the secretary of the United States department of transportation finds any part of this chapter to be in conflict with federal requirements that are a prescribed condition to the allocation of federal funds to the "state", the conflicting part of this chapter is hereby declared to be inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict and with respect to the agencies directly affected, and such finding or determination shall not affect the operation of the remainder of this chapter in its application to the agencies concerned. THE RULES UNDER THIS CHAPTER SHALL MEET FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS THAT ARE A NECESSARY CONDITION TO THE RECEIPT OF FEDERAL FUNDS BY THE STATE. [1985 c 142 § 4.] And;
In addition to the foregoing, RCW 46.04.360, under the section titled "Nonresident," reads: 
"Nonresident" means any person whose residence is outside this state and who is temporarily sojourning WITHIN THIS STATE. [1961 c 12 § 46.04.360. Prior: 1959 c 49 § 37; prior: (i) 1943 c 153 § 1, part; 1937 c 188 § 1, part; Rem. Supp. 1943 § 6312-1, part. (ii) 1937 c 189 § 1, part; RRS § 6360-1, part.] (emphasis added) And;
This Court must take Mandatory Judicial Notice ER201 of CR 44.1 Determination of Foreign Law of which I now object, take exception and make an OFFER OF PROOF ER 103(2) that this "fictional court" has NO jurisdiction in the premises for failure to provide proof that I was "driving" a "motor vehicle" in a "FEDERAL AREA.". See California and North Carolina’s consistent definition’s of those states "municipal law’s" which require some sort of "contract" for proper application within the "federal areas" of the "NEW UNION."
"Section 11205. "In this State," etc.
"In this State" or "in the State" means within the exterior limits of the State of California and includes all territory within these limits owned or ceded to the United States of America. Added Stats 1941 section 1, effective July 1, 1943. Prior Law: Stats 1937 ch. 283 section 2 subd (d) p 621, as amended by Stats 1941 ch 162 section 1 p 1202." And;
"Section 6017. "In this State" or "in the State"
"In this State" or "in the State" means within the exterior limits of the State of California and includes all territory within these limits owned by or ceded to the United States of America. Added Stats 1941 ch 36 section 1, effective July 1, 1943. Prior Law: (a) Stats 1933 ch 1020 section 2 subd (i) p 2599, as amended by Stats 1935 ch 357 section 2 p 1256, Stats 1937 ch 778 section 1 p 2223, Stats 1939 ch 679 section 2 p 2170, Stats 1941 ch 247 section 1 p 1321. (b) Stats 1935 ch. 361 section 2 subd (j) p 1297, as amended by Stats 1937 ch 683 section 1 p 1936, Stats 1939 ch 677 section 1 p 2154, Stats 1941 ch 247 section 14 p 1334. And;
"N.C. G.S. 105-164.3(7) "In this State" or "in the State" means within the exterior limits of the State of North Carolina and includes all territories within such limits owned or ceded to the United States of America. (Added Stats. 1941, c. 36, p. 536, section 1.)"
"N.C. G.S. Sections 105-187.2 A tax is imposed for the privilege of using the highways of this State. This tax is in addition to all other taxes and fees imposed. (Stats. 19889, c.692, s.4.1)
"N.C. G.S. 12-3 Statutory Construction;
"State" and "United States".–The word "state," when applied to the different parts of the united States, shall be construed to extend to and include the District of Columbia and the several territories, so called; and the words "United States" shall be construed to include the said districts and territories and all dependencies.’
It is clear that North Carolina Statutes, California Statutes and Washington Statutes agree completely with the "Buck Act" Title 4 U.S.C.S. sections 105-110, and is indentical in implication and meaning. This tax is imposed on every motor vehicle used in any "federal area" such as the Central District of STATE OF WASHINGTON aka "WA", Social Security Area, federal ZIP Code area, etc.
These definitions are consistent with the definitions mandated by the "BUCK ACT" which states in part:
"110(d) The term "State" includes any Territory or possession of the United States." And;
"11(e) The term "Federal Area" means any lands or premises held or acquired by or for the use of the United States or any department, establishment, or agency of the United States; and any Federal area, or any part thereof, which is located within the exterior boundaries of any State, shall be deemed to be a Federal area located within such State."
The Social Security Department created 10 social security districts which like a thin plastic sheet overlay all the 50 states of the union. This creates a "fictional federal state within a state," for the purposes of applying the "Public Salary Tax Act" to these areas.
"There has been created a fictional Federal "state within a state." Howard v. Commisioners of Sinking fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 73. S.Ct. 465, 476, 97 L.Ed. 617 (1953); Schwartz v. O’Hara TP. School Dist., 100 A.2d 621, 625, 375 Pa. 440.
(Compare also 31 C.F.R. Part 51.2 and 52.2, which also identifies a fictional State within a state.)
This fictional "State" is identified by the use of two-letter abbreviations like ‘WA", "OR", "ID", "AZ", and "TX" as distinguished form the authorized abbreviations like "Wash.", etc. This fictional State also uses a ZIP codes which are within the municipal, exclusive legislative jurisdiction of Congress. And;
There is a vestige of State sovereignty remaining which cannot be acquired by the United States (District of Columbia) because of the limitation of the United States to powers delegated under the Constitution. See Cal. 7 Ops Atty Gen. 628; 37 Am. Jur, Municipal Corp sections 23, 26; Wichita Falls v. Bowen, 143 Tex. 45, 182 S.W.2d., 154 A.L.R. 1434; 62 CJS, Mun. Corp. section 46, page 133; Norfolk County v. Portsmouth, 186 Va. 1032, 45 S.E.2d. 136; Anchorage v. Akers, (D.C. Alaska), 100 F.Supp. 2; Kiker v. Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 624, 31 A.2d 289.
This was accomplished by the institution of the "Buck Act," 4 U.S.C.S. sections 104-113, to implement the application of the "Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 to the "employees" working within the private sector. This makes all private sector workers who have and "use" a Social Security number subject to all State and Federal laws "within the State" a "fictional Federal area" overlaying all the land "within" the United States.
"Respondent contends article 2(a) RCW 9.100.010 supports its argument that "state", as used in RCW 9.95.120, includes the United States. However reference to article 2(a) supports petitioner’s contention. Article 2(a) specifically defines "state" to include the United States, making it clear that when the legislature intends the word "state" to include the federal jurisdiction., it has done so with language clearly manifesting that intent." IN RE LEHMAN, 93 Wn.2d 25, 27, 28 [No. 46150. En Banc. January 10, 1980.] And;
"In State ex rel. Best v. Superior Court, supra, we said (pp. 240, 241),  ". . . By the enabling act, Washington was authorized to a adopt a constitution, establish a state government, and was admitted into the Union upon equal footing with the original states, which carried with it the full power of enacting laws against crimes and punishing all those within her borders who might transgress such laws, be they citizens or not. This must be so, since the state became sovereign, with full power, except those powers which had been delegated to the national government. And relator has not contended, and cannot contend, that any power was ever delegated to the national government to enact or enforce or enforce criminal laws applicable within the territorial limits of any state, except those portions thereof which were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal government, such as Indian reservations and the like. . . ." IN RE WESLEY v. SCHNECKLOTH, 55 Wn. (2d) 90, 98 [No. 34127. En Banc. November 19, 1959.] and;
"Both parties agreed that, prior to the passage of the Buck Act (1940) 4 U.S.C.A. SSSS 105-110, the various states of the Union had no legal basis for imposing a tax on the activities of a business or individual, when such activities were carried on exclusively within the confines of a federal reservation. They are also in agreement that the effect of the Buck Act was to grant to the states certain taxing powers. This is specifically provided in 4 U.S.C.A. 4 106:"
"(a) No person shall be relieved from liability for any income tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, by reason of his residing within a Federal area or receiving income from transactions occurring or services performed in such area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and powers to levy and collect such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area." Alaska v. Baker, 64 Wn.2d 207, 390 P.2d 1009 (1964) And;
"The area within, and under, the jurisdiction of a state may come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States by purchase by the Federal Government for a purpose prescribed by the Federal Constitution and with the consent of the state, or by cession of exclusive jurisdiction by the state to the United States. In either event, the land acquires a territorial status and ceases to be a part of the state, either territorially or jurisdictionally. Concessions Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac. 655." RYAN v. STATE, 188 Wash. 115, 130 [No. 26060. En Banc. October 28, 1936.] And;
"Irrespective of what tax is called by state law, if its purpose is to produce revenue, it is income tax or receipts tax Under Buck Act [4 U.S.C.S. sections 105-110"." Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Calvert, (1971) 464 S.W.2d 170, affd. (Tex.) 478 S.W.2d 926, cert den. 409 U.S. 967, 34 L.Ed.2d 234, 93 S.Ct. 293.
There is NO doubt that the Fictional Federal Municipal Corporate STATE OF WASHINGTON is attempting to impose directly a "USE" tax (excise) under the provision of 4 U.S.C.S. Section 105 which states in pertinent part:
"Section 105. State and so forth, taxation affecting Federal Areas; sales and use tax.
(a) No person shall be relieved from liability for payment of, collection of, or accountin for any sales or use tax levied by any State, or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such tax, on the ground that the sale or use, with respect to which tax is levied, occurred in whole or in part withing a Federal area; and such State or taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect any such tax in any Federal area, within such State to the same extent and with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area."
"A "Federal area" is any area designated by any agency, Division, or establishment of the federal government. This includes the Social Security areas designated by the Social Security Administration, any public housing area that has federal funding, a home that has a federal bank loan, a road that has federal funding, and almost everything that the federal government touches through any type of aid." Springfield v. Kenny, (1951 App.) 104 N.E.2d. 65.
This "Federal area" attaches to anyone who has and "uses" a social security number or any personal "minimal contacts" with the federal or State governments. Thus, the federal government has usurped the Sovereignty of the People and State Sovereignty by creating these "fictional federal areas" within the boundaries of the state under the authority of the Federal Constitution, Article IV, Section 2 which reads:
"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needfull rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state."
"Therefore, the U.S. citizens [citizens of the District of Columbia] residing in one of the states of the union, are classified as property and franchises of the federal government as an "individual entity." Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 80 L.Ed. 1143, 56 S.Ct. 773.  (I got this particular cite from Richard McDonald's material which apparently misquotes the case?)
"A "U.S. Citizen" upon leaving the District of Columbia becomes involved in "interstate commerce", as a "resident" does not have the common-law right to travel, of a Citizen of one of the several states." Hendrick v. Marylalnd S.C. Reporter’s Rd. 610-625. (1914). And;
"The governments of the united States and each of the several states are distinct from one another. The rights of a citizen under one may be quite different from those which he has under the other."Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404.
"Both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the United States in order to be a citizen of his state." United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875). And;
"The several states are sovereign "countries" and the "United States Government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state." 81 C.J.S. 896, 102 STAT. 4673, 100-702 Sec. 1022 Laws of 100th Congress. -2nd sess., N.y. - In Merriam, 36 N.E. 505, 141 N.Y. 479, affirmed 16 S.Ct.1073, 163 U.S. 625, 41 L.Ed. 287, 20 C.J.S. 1786. And;
WHAT IS A RESIDENT?
(Citizen and Resident are not synonymous terms, domicile and residence are not synonymous, therefor a Citizen is a nonresident. Bouviers, Blacks, Ballentines Law Dictionaries.)
"Residence or doing business in a hostile territory is the test of an "alien enemy: within meaning of Trading with the Enemy Act and Executive Orders thereunder." Executive Order March 11, 1942. No. 9095, as amended 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix 6: Trading with the enemy Act 5 (b). In re Oneida Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Utica, 53 N.Y.S. 2d 416, 420, 421, 183 Misc. 374. And;
"By the modern phrase, a man who resides under the allegiance and protection of a hostile state for commercial purposes is to be considered to all civil purposes as much as an ‘alien enemy’ as if he were born there." Hutchinson v. Brock, 11 Mass. 119, 122. And;
See also Internal Revenue Code Section 7701(39) which reads:
"I.R.C. Section 7701(39) IF ANY CITIZEN OR RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT RESIDE IN (AND IS NOT FOUND IN) ANY UNITED STATES JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SUCH CITIZEN OR RESIDENT SHALL BE TREATED AS RESIDING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FOR PURPOSES OF ANY PROVISIONS OF THIS TITLE TO–
(A) jurisdiction of courts, or
(B) enforcement of summons."
Also see Internal Revenue Code Section 7408(C) and Art. 1, Section 8, Clause 17 Constitution for the United States of America as defined and reinstated in National Mutual Insurance Company of the District of Columbia, 337 U.S. 582, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1948) and further states that citizens of the District of Columbia are not embraced by the judicial power under Article 3 of the Constitution for the United States of America, the same statement is held in Hepburn v. Dundas v. Elizey, 2 Cranch (U.S.) 445, 2 L.Ed. 332.; In 1804, the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, held that a citizen of the District of Columbia was not a citizen of a state.
In NATIONAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. TIDEWATER TRANSFER COMPANY, (SUPRA), "We therefore decline to overrule the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, and we hold that the District of Columbia is not a state within Article 3 of the Constitution. In other words cases between citizens of the District and those of the states were not included of the catalogue of controversies over which the Congress could give jurisdiction to the federal courts by virtue of Article 3. In other words Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction over citizens of washington District of Columbia and through their plenary power nationally covers those citizens even when in one of the several states as though the district expands for the purpose of regulating its citizens wherever they go throughout the states in union. And furthermore, there is a limitation of power defined in TITLE 4-FLAG AND SEAL, SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES, at page 380 U.S.C. at Chapter 3 Sections 71 & 72 to wit:
Section 71. Permanent seat of Government
All that part of the territory of the United States included within the present limits of the District of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United States.
(July 30, 1947, chapter 389, 61 Stat. 643.)
Section 72. Public offices, at seat of Government
All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as expressly provided by law.
(July 30, 1947, chapter 389, 61 Stat 643.)
WHAT IS OR WHO ARE CITIZENS?
It is shown that Fourteenth Amendment citizens/subjects are artificial persons created by the legislature (Congress) and cannot claim protections secured by Article IV, section 2.
III. Who are Citizens – 1. "Corporations as Citizens. – Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of this clause. The term ‘citizen’ as there used applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic owing allegiance to the state, not to artificial persons created by the legislature and possessing only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed." Volume IX 1888 Fed. Stats. Page 162.
"To aliens we extend these privileges (citizenship via Fourteenth Amendment) by courtesy; to others we secure them--" (Emphasis Added..) Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. Supreme Ct. 43, 48 (1872)
WHAT IS AN ALIEN ENEMY?
So you can further understand the word Alien Enemy and what it means to be declared an enemy of the government, read the following definitions: The phrase Alien Enemy is defined in Bouviers Law Dictionary as :
"One who owes allegiance to the adverse belligerent." 1 Kent 73. And;
"He who owes a temporary but not a permanent allegiance is an alien enemy in respects to acts done during such temporary allegiance only; and when his allegiance terminates, his hostile character terminates also; 1 B. & P. 163. And;
"Alien enemies are said to have no rights, no privileges, unless by the king’s favor during time of war; 1 Bla. Com. 372; Bynkershoek 195; 8 Term 166. And;
"The phrase Alien Enemy is defined in Words and Phrases as : Residence of person in territory of nation at war with United States was sufficient to characterize him as "alien enemy" within Trading with the Enemy Act, even if he had acquired and retained American citizenship." Matarrese v. Matarrese, 59 A.2d 262, 265, 142 N.J. Eq. 226. And;
Under the "Buck Act" 4 U.S.C.S. sections 105-110, the federal government has created a fictional "Federal area" within the boundaries of North Carolina, California and Washington. This area is similar to any territory that the federal government acquires through purchase or conquest, thereby imposing federal territorial law upon those "residing" in said "Federal area" which is called the "State of Washington." In fine point of fact and law, the enforcement of registration and taxation of motor vehicles is being carried out under federal military territorial law as evidenced by the Executive Branch’s yellow fringed military and territorial U.S. Flag flying in the courtrooms and Department of Licensing offices. See RCW 38 Militia and Military affairs.
THE TERM "PERSON" INCLUDES THIS STATE!!!
In order to use a civil process to enforce a private right, there must be an agreement upon which the private right is alleged. The RCW is a compilation of private [laws](sic) Copyrighted Codes intended to govern the members of the private corporation "forum state"known as "STATE OF WASHINGTON". STATE OF WASHINGTON having left any previously held plain of sovereignty to take on the status of a private corporation. "It is for some purposes, although not others, treated as a "person." When the United States enters into a commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation." 91 CJS UNITED STATES §4 . The term person identifies this state, RCW 1.16.080 (1) The term "person" may be construed to include the United States, this state, or any state or territory, or any public or private corporation or limited liability company, as well as an individual. The definition would not include this state IF this state was Sovereign. "In Common Usage, the term "person" does not include the sovereign and statute employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, U.S. 258,91. See also United States v. Fox 94 U.S. 315. The "person" liable to the RCW is a legal fiction. RCW 9A.04.110 (17) "Person", "he", and "actor" include any natural person and, where relevant, a corporation, joint stock association, or an unincorporated association; Or see RCW 46.04.405 "Person" includes every natural person, firm, copartnership, corporation, association, or organization. The term "person" as used in the RCW is always a fictional entity. See also cannon of statutory construction Ejusdem Generis to wit:
"Of the same kind, class or nature. In the construction of laws, wills, and other instruments, the "ejusdem generis rule" is that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.U.S. v. LaBrecque" Blacks Law Dictionary 6th ED. And;
STATE OF WASHINGTON IS MERELY A FEDERAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
"The territory is a municipal corporation and government, representing all the people within its borders. The county of Spokane is an agency of the territory to carry on certain functions of government. Neither the territory nor county are the real party in interest; but the inhabitants are. The territory by statute is authorized to accept and collect these bonds for the use of the people, and is a trustee of a trust expressed by statute." AINSWORTH v. TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON, 2 Wash. Territory 270, 278 (Janaury 21, 1887). And;
"That a state government comes within the purview of the act is manifest by the definition of "person" contained in section 302 (h) (U.S.C.A. (Supt.), section 942 (h)). If state governments are not included within the term "any other government," then no political subdivision of any state nor any state agency comes within the purview of the act, for, obviously, the political subdivisions and agencies "of the foregoing" are such as are set up and included within "any other government" within the scope of the act." SOUNDVIEW PULP CO. v. TAYLOR, 21 Wn.(d) 261, 276 ((July 22, 1944.) And;
"The state acts in two capacities: governmental and proprietary. The distinction between the two is best stated in Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio St. 336, approved by this court in Seattle v. Stirrat, 55 Wash. 560, 104 Pac. 834, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1275:
"In its governmental or public character, it represents the state, while in the other it is a mere private corporation. As a political institution, the municipality occupies a different position, and is subject to different liabilities from those which are imposed upon the private corporation. But because these two characters are united in the same legal entity, it does not follow that the shield which covers the political equally protects the private corporation." STRAND v. STATE., 16 Wn.(2d) 107, 116 (January 6, 1943). And;
It is an Undisputed Fact of Law pursuant to CR 8 (d) that I the Sovereign accused do not reside or travel "IN THIS STATE" or "WITHIN THIS STATE" or within any other "FEDERAL AREAS" lying within the exterior boundaries of the State, when I temporarily sojourn or locomote on the "public highways" in a "recreational vehicle" pursuant to RCW 46.25.050(1)(c) and defined at WAC 308-100-210, as I am "STATELESS" to the "CORPORATE STATES," and without the conterminous United States of America and its instrumentalities. I do not in "RE" on any "SIDE" of the court "IN THIS STATE" or "WITHIN THIS STATE." And;
I am not a member of, nor do I have allegiance to, the Federal Conterminous United States of America, or its instrumentalities known as "WA," "OR," "AK," "CA," or "MO" further defined by Zone Improvement Plan Codes [ZIP Codes] for federal areas. See Minimum Contacts Doctrine for judicial notice, not cited. The Defendant has no (corporate) STATE OF WASHINGTON address, does not reside in the STATE OF WASHINGTON or "WITHIN" any federal areas within the exterior boundaries of "THE STATE," and only occasionally obtains postal matter at general delivery or P.O. Boxes in Five (5) different states, as he travels through Washington, the republic. And;
luis anthony ewing is an internationally protected person (18 USC 112) who is neither a "RESIDENT", nor [c]itizen, of the Federal Municipal Corporation AKA "STATE OF WASHINGTON", nor the UNITED STATES. As such luis anthony ewing has no ‘minimal contracts’ which are made with the STATE OF WASHINGTON, or STATE OF OREGON which the Supreme Court concludes is dispositive per Asahi Metal Industry Co. , Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026; Burger King Corporation v. John Rudzewicz, (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174; World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, (1980) 444 U.S. 286. 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L ED 2d 490; International Shoes Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L Ed 95; Shaffer v. Heitner, (1977) 433 US 186. And;
As a "STATELESS" Sovereign, luis anthony ewing’s right of travel is guaranteed by the Northwest Ordinance which guarantees that the waterways shall FOREVER BE FREE the same as the HIGHWAYS and the United Nations Treaty, to which the United States is a signatory ( United Nations Declaration of Rights).
"U.S.Va. 1796. The provision of the constitution of the United States that all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of that government, shall be the supreme law of the land, extends not only to treaties thereafter made, but also to those in existence when the constitution was ratified by the several legislatures." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 3 Dall. 199, 1 L.Ed. 568. And; 
U.S.La. 1836. Congress cannot by legislation enlarge the federal jurisdiction, and it cannot be enlarged under the treaty making power." Mayor, Alderman and Inhabitants of City of New Orleans v. U.S., 35 U.S. 662, 10 Pet. 662, 9 L.Ed. 573. And;
"U.S.Mo. 1920. Valid treaties are binding within the territorial limits of the states as throughout the dominion of the United States." State of Mo. v. Holland, 40 S.Ct. 382, 252 U.S. 416, 64 L.Ed. 641, 11 A.L.R. 984. And;
The great State of Washington is a "country" within the meaning of 18 United States Code SS 11, and luis anthony ewing is a member of a body of insurgents, within the State of Washington known to the United States as "Americans".
As such luis anthony ewing is a member of a foreign government and qualifies for protection from the State of Washington, as "any other representative " Statute at Large 15, of said body of insurgents (who are peaceful in their actions) [18 USC 1116 (b) 4 B)] and is entitled to "special protection" from the State of Washington or State of Oregon, both Federal Municipal Corporations. This court lacks subject and personam jurisdiction over the Defendant, and Personam jurisdiction over the Defendant for the charges against him. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proof of jurisdiction and statutory authority.
The word "territory" should not go without mention because of its use in connection with the word state. Like the word state, the word territory has more than one meaning. Sometimes it is referring strictly to the geographical boundaries of a state, but most often it is used in the combined sense of both jurisdiction and a geographical boundary.
Since both the government of the state and "We, the people" of the State exist as states simultaneously within the same geographical territory of a state, then, it is obvious that the territory of a state must mean something more than just a geographical boundary. This is a reasonable conclusion because Black's, at page 1473, defines the term "Territory" as, "A part of a country separated from the rest, and subject to a particular jurisdiction. Geographical area under the jurisdiction of another country or sovereign power." (emph. added).
The above fraud of the "Territory of Washington" is further evidenced on the 13th day in the month of December in the year A.D. 1889 in the session laws of 1889 (page 94); and,
The courts unlawfully order by rule the wrong style of process and order up unconstitutional seals. The judicial operates under "STATE OF WASHINGTON" meaning "territory of Washington" as defined under "Act of Dec. 13, page 94, Session Laws 1889-90, Resolution 33, 1889-90 and Article 27 Const. of WA," and two unconstitutional state statutes, creating the superior and supreme courts by statute without authority of law. This usurpation making or retaining a "Federal Territorial" jurisdiction unlawfully subjecting We, the People, the Posterity of the framers of the Constitution for the united States of America and subject to the principals of the Unanimous Declaration of the 13 united States of America, enacted the 4th day of July, A.D. 1776, to be not within the equal footing doctrine guaranteed by the Enabling Act of "Congress" and the Constitution of 1787, as amended 1791, to suffer martial law rule, (no law at all), no Republic and other peonage by you perpetrators pretending to be operating under the law of We, the People, the State of Washington.
The First Session Laws of 1889_90, at page 26, of the "phony legislature" for the Corporation AKA "STATE OF WASHINGTON" pretended to enact provisions to purchase Barton's Hand_Book and "pretend" Legislature Manual of Washington. At page 37 of this book are the words "STATE OF WASHINGTON," prefacing by itself, the Enabling Act and the Constitution. The intent of Senate Joint Resolution No. 33, page 792 of the Session Laws of 1889_90, was carried to it's completion. The original and independent authority, of Article XXVII of the constitution was used to create a parallel government which is in fact and law a "Federal Municipal Corporation" pretending to be our lawful government not authorized by the Constitution and certainly not republican in form. 
The unconstitutional legislatively created "statutory courts," with no Constitutional power, can only take "jurisdiction in the premises" of the case which is the law (private law) and copyrighted by West publishing of the case or at law and only hear the issue as predicated through the syllogisms in the complaint as purviewed through or defined in the "Territorial Code of 1881" which is further laid out in your revised code of Washington which is in fact and law the "Territorial Code of 1881" revised, in particular RCW 82.04.200., excise and occupational tax, ""In this state" or "within this state" includes all Federal areas lying within the exterior boundaries of the state of Washington." Includes as defined in Black's Law Dict., page 687, "to shut up, keep within". "Jurisdiction in the premises" constitutes stipulation and bars litigants from challenging the rules and code unless the original premises are rebutted and debunked. This Declaration rebuts, denies and debunks the premise we are in original jurisdiction and Of "WASHINGTON'S" premises upon premises upon premises that it and it's code are constitutional and republican in form AND OPENS THIS SOPHISTRY FOR ALL TO SEE.
If The State of Washington or Oregon government had been established according to law, (the Constitution for the State of Washington)or Oregon) the Superior and Supreme Courts would not need a statute to operate under and they would take jurisdiction in law not in the premises (see, In Re Rafferty, and other cases), all process and prosecutions would be in the style and modes as mandated by the People in the Constitution. The issues would be heard under the rules of common-law. The Fundamental Common Law, (the law of God and His nature) would be the prevailing factor, along with the lawful Statutes of the Legislature would be the law in the courts, not the RCW. Article IV Section 24, mandates the superior courts promulgate and establish their own rules, the courts would declare the law, the juries, (12 Men, common-law rule), would rule on the law and the facts in all cases AND BE INSTRUCTED THAT THEY HOLD THE POWER AND THE RIGHT TO DO SO, each county under the rule of the common law would need different rules as the common law of each county would evolve somewhat different from the others. There would be Citizen Grand Jury investigations of violations of law instead of coroners and police inquest and trials with 6 chainmen (persons) advising the harbor master ("judge") on facts pertaining to the territorial maritime code violations. We, the People, would be self governing, with true Liberty and justice for all, IN EQUITY AND ALL, THE COURTS WOULD DECLARE THE LAW, not rule on code violations. I deny all venue and jurisdiction to this state, within this state, in this state, state and STATE OF WASHINGTON OR WA, and the same argument applies to Oregon, State of Oregon, or "STATE OF OREGON", OR, ALL THESE TERMS MEANING TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON OR OREGON AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
A geographical boundary then, is of secondary importance; of primary importance is jurisdiction. It should be noted that, in most instances, the word state is synonymous with the word jurisdiction, both being used to mean the same thing. Obviously then, two elements must be present in order to have a complete definition of a state's territory: (1) its jurisdiction and (2) its geographical boundary.
If a little "reason," "logic," and common sense is applied to the foregoing definition of the word "territory," one can easily see that the Constitution for The State of Washington created "a particular jurisdiction" in a "part of a country [state] separated from the rest," in a "Geographical area under the jurisdiction of another....sovereign power." In other words, "We, the People," the "sovereign power" "of The State of Washington created an entity known as the government of The State of Washington, which is "a particular jurisdiction" "separated from" "We, the People" in the "Geographical area" known as The State of Washington. However you rascals, not the People attempted to create a false government and almost got away with it, foisting STATE OF WASHINGTON off as The State of Washington.
PRIVATE AUTOMOBILES ARE EXEMPT FROM BUCK ACT TAXATION!
"Privately owned Buses not engaged in for hire Transportation are outside the jurisdiction of Division of Motor Vehicles enforcement of N.C. G.S. Article 17, Chapter 20***" 58 N.C.A.G. 1 (It follows that those Citizens not engaged in extraordinary use of the highway for profit or gain are likewise outside the jurisdiction of the Division of Motor Vehicles.)
"Since a sale of personal property is not required to be evidenced by any written instrument in order to be valid, it has been held in North Carolina that there may be a transfer of title to an automobile without complying with the registration statute which requires a transfer and delivery of a certificate of title." N.C. Law Review Vol. 32 page 545, Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N.C. 157.
"A vested right of action is Property in the same sense in which tangible things are property, and is equally protected against interferences. Where it springs from contract, or from the principles of common law, it is not competent for the legislature to take it away." Williams v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 153 N.C. 360, 69 S.E. 402 (1910) (Case note to North Carolina G.S. 12-3 "Statutory Construction").
"The following shall be exempt from the requirements of registration and the certificate of title:
1.) Any such vehicle driven or moved upon the highway in conformance with the provisions of this Article relating to manufacturers, dealers, or nonresidents."
2.) Any such vehicle which is driven or moved upon a highway only for the purpose of crossing such highway from one property to another. ****20-51(1)(2)(comment: not driven or moved upon the highway for transporting persons or property for profit.)
See California Motor Vehicle Code, section 260: Private cars/vans etc. not in commerce / for profit, are immune to registration fees:
(a) A "commercial vehicle" is a vehicle of a type REQUIRED to be REGISTERED under this code".
(b) "Passenger vehicles which are not used for the transportation of persons for hire, compensation or profit, and housecars, are not commercial vehicles".
(c) "a vanpool vehicle is not a commercial vehicle." And;
"A vehicle not used for commercial activity is a "consumer goods", ...it is NOT a type of vehicle required to be registered and "use tax" paid of which the tab is evidence of receipt of the tax." Bank of Boston vs Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484, UCC PP 9-109.14. And;
"It is held that a tax upon common carriers by motor vehicles is based upon a reasonable classification, and does not involve any unconstitutional discrimination, although it does not apply to private vehicles, or those used by the owner in his own business, and not for hire." Desser v. Wichita, (1915) 96 Kan. 820; Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v. Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R. 22. And;
NO IMMUNITY DUE TO MERE CORPORATE STATUS:
The Clearfield Doctrine, as set forth in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363-371, states:
"Governments descend to the level of mere private corporation, and take on the characteristics of a mere private citizen where private corporate commercial paper (Federal Reserve Notes) and securities (checks) is concerned. ...For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as entities entirely separate from government." Bank of United States v. Planter’s Bank, 9 Wheaton (22 U.S.) 904, 6 L. Ed. 24. And;
"Governments lose their immunity and descend to level of private corporations when involved in commercial activity enforcing negotiable instruments, as in fines, penalties, assessments, bails, taxes, the remedy lies in the hand of the state and its municipalities seeking remedy." Rio Grande v. Darke, 167 P. 241. And;
"It is for some purposes, although not others, treated as a "person." When the United States enters into a commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation." 91 CJS UNITED STATES §4 . 
RCW 1.16.080 (1) The term "person" may be construed to include the United States, this state, or any state or territory, or any public or private corporation or limited liability company, as well as an individual. 
"Governments are corporations." Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dallas 55. And;
Private corporations and their officers are not immune from civil damages.
"The principles of estoppel apply against the state as well as individuals." (Cal. v. Sims, 32 C3d 468). And;
"It being impossible to obtain the remedy sought, the state and their agencies/municipalities being impotent to enforce their judgments/decrees and thus should not even exercise their otherwise ‘general’ jurisdictions." Louisiana v. NAL, 106 La. 621. And;
"Mere equity is impotent to correct the defect." McGraw v. Gortner, 96 Md 489. And;
"A law which restricts their power to render and enforce a judgment is therefore a limitation upon the exercise of jurisdiction; and a law which destroys or impairs the effect which their judgments without such law would have, is equally so." Fordyce v. Beecher, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 29, 31. And;
"Unable to ‘comply’"
31 ALR 649. And;
"...to comply is impossible, made so by the failure of the state in its constitutional duty, U.S. Const. 1: 10:1, the remedy resting in the hands of the state." Rio Grande v. Darke, 167 P. 241.
YES, I KNOW WHAT YOU ARE THINKING!  
ALL THE TAX PROTESTERS AND ALL THE TAX GURUS ARE ABSOLUTELY WRONG AND DON'T KNOW WHAT THE HELL THEY ARE TALKING ABOUT AND WE ARE "FUCKED."  (Excuse my language, but by now you should be as pissed off as I am at all the legal lunatics we have been getting bad advice from).
AT FIRST THE TRUTH WILL DEFINITELY PISS YOU OFF AND THEN IT WILL SET YOU FREE!
Do you want to learn more?
Then have me come and teach a Seminar in your State and I can explain what we all need to do to take our country back and put these punks in BLACK ROBES OF TREASON back in their place as mere impartial and neutral referees.
Luis Ewing at (253) 226-3741 or rcwcodebuster@hotmail.com
 >From: Paycheck-Piracy-list-owner@mail-list.com 
To: rcwcodebuster@hotmail.com 
Subject: Which class of taxpayer are you? 
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 00:17:59 -0700 
 
We are a nation of laws(statutes). Here's how our law defines a "taxpayer".  Which are you? 
 
THE STATUTES AT LARGE  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

FROM 

JANUARY 1935 TO JUNE 1936 

74TH CONGRESS. SESS. II. CHS. 690. JUNE 22, 1936. 
 
SEC. 4. SPECIAL CLASSES OF TAXPAYERS. 
The application of the General Provisions and of  Supplements A to D, inclusive, to each of the following 
special classes of taxpayers, shall be subject to the exceptions and additional provisions found in the 
Supplement applicable to such class, as follows: 

 (a) Estates and trusts and the beneficiaries thereof,-Supplement E. 
 
 (b) Members of partnerships,-Supplement F. 

 (c) Insurance companies,-Supplement G. 
 (d) Nonresident alien individuals,-Supplement H. 

(e) Foreign corporations,-Supplement I. 
 
(f) Individual citizens of any possession of the United 
States who are not otherwise citizens of the United 
States and who are not residents of the United 
States,-Supplement J. 
 
(g) Individual citizens of the United States or domestic corporations, satisfying the conditions of section 251 by 
reason of deriving a large portion of their gross income from sources within a possession of the United States,-Supplement J. 
 
(h) China Trade Act corporations,-Supplement K. 
 
All Rights Reserved 
Loma M. Wharton 
======================================= 
 
No law compels a work eligible man or woman to submit a form W-4 or W-9(or their equivalent) nor disclose an SSN as a condition of being hired or keeping one's job.  With the exception of an order from a court of competent jurisdiction, no amounts can be lawfully taken from one's pay (for taxes, fees or other charges) without the worker's explicit, knowing, voluntary, written consent. (In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.)